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Abstract
We analyze the sample complexity of learning graphi-
cal games from purely behavioral data. We assume that
we can only observe the players’ joint actions and not
their payoffs. We analyze the sufficient and necessary
number of samples for the correct recovery of the set of
pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) of the true game.
Our analysis focuses on directed graphs with n nodes
and at most k parents per node. Sparse graphs corre-
spond to k P Op1q with respect to n, while dense graphs
correspond to k P Opnq. By using VC dimension argu-
ments, we show that if the number of samples is greater
than Opkn log2 nq for sparse graphs or Opn2 lognq for
dense graphs, then maximum likelihood estimation cor-
rectly recovers the PSNE with high probability. By us-
ing information-theoretic arguments, we show that if the
number of samples is less than Ωpkn log2 nq for sparse
graphs or Ωpn2 lognq for dense graphs, then any con-
ceivable method fails to recover the PSNE with arbitrary
probability.
1 Introduction
Non-cooperative game theory has been considered as the
appropriate mathematical framework in which to for-
mally study strategic behavior in multi-agent scenarios.
The core solution concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [15]
serves a descriptive role of the stable outcome of the over-
all behavior of self-interested agents (e.g., people, compa-
nies, governments, groups or autonomous systems) inter-
acting strategically with each other in distributed set-
tings.
Algorithmic Game Theory and Applications.
There has been considerable progress on computing clas-
sical equilibrium solution concepts such as NE and cor-
related equilibria [1] in graphical games (see, e.g., [3, 12,
13,14,17,18,20] and the references therein) as well as on
computing the price of anarchy in graphical games (see,
e.g., [2]). Indeed, graphical games played a prominent role
in establishing the computational complexity of comput-
ing NE in general normal-form games (see, e.g., [6] and
the references therein).
In political science for instance, the work of [10] identi-
fied the most influential senators in the U.S. congress (i.e.,
a small set of senators whose collectively behavior forces
every other senator to a unique choice of vote). The most
influential senators were intriguingly similar to the gang-
of-six senators formed during the national debt ceiling
negotiation in 2011. Additionally, it was observed in [9]
that the influence from Obama to Republicans increased
in the last sessions before candidacy, while McCain’s in-
fluence to Republicans decreased.
Learning Graphical Games. The problems in algo-
rithmic game theory described above (i.e., computing
Nash equilibria, computing the price of anarchy, or find-
ing the most influential agents) require a known graphical
game which is unobserved in the real world. To overcome
this issue, learning binary-action graphical games from
behavioral data was proposed in [9], by using maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE). We also note that [9, 10]
have shown the successful use of graphical games in real-
world settings, such as the analysis of the U.S. congres-
sional voting records as well as the U.S. supreme court.
More recently, the work of [8] provides a statistically
and computationally efficient method for learning binary-
action sparse games.
Contributions. In this paper, we study the statistical
aspects of the problem of learning graphical games with
general discrete actions from strictly behavioral data. As
in [8,9], we assume that we can only observe the players’
joint actions and not their payoffs. The class of models
considered here are polymatrix graphical games [11, 14].
We study the sufficient and necessary number of samples
for the correct recovery of the pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria (PSNE) set of the true game, for directed graphs
with n nodes and at most k parents per node. Theorem 3
shows that the sufficient number of samples for MLE is
Opkn log2 nq for sparse graphs, and Opn2 lognq for dense
graphs. Theorem 4 shows that the necessary number of
samples for any conceivable method is Ωpkn log2 nq for
sparse graphs, and Ωpn2 lognq for dense graphs. Thus,
MLE is statistically optimal.
Discussion. While sparsity-promoting methods were
used in prior work [8, 9] for binary actions, the bene-
fit of sparsity for learning games with general discrete
actions has not been theoretically analyzed before. In
this paper, we focus on the statistical analysis of exact
MLE.1 Prior work on MLE estimation [9] has not fo-
1We leave the analysis of computationally efficient methods for
future work. To put this in context, note that theoretical analysis
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cused on the correct PSNE recovery, but on generalization
bounds. More formally, Corollary 15 in [9] shows that for
dense graphs with n nodes and binary actions, Opn3q
samples are sufficient for the empirical MLE minimizer
to be close to the best achievable expected log-likelihood.
As a byproduct of our PSNE recovery analysis, Lemma 2
shows that for dense graphs and general discrete actions,
only Opn2 lognq samples are sufficient for obtaining a
good expected log-likelihood. Regarding PSNE recovery,
the results of [8] provide a Opk4 lognq sample complexity
for learning binary-action sparse games. The above re-
sults pertain to a specific class of payoff functions with a
particular parametric representation, that allows for a lo-
gistic regression approach. The results in [8] also assume
strict positivity of the payoffs in the PSNE set. Thus, it
is unclear how these results can be extended to general
discrete actions.
2 Graphical Games
In classical game-theory (see, e.g. [7] for a textbook in-
troduction), a normal-form game is defined by a set of
n players V “ t1, . . . , nu, and for each player i, a set
of actions, or pure-strategies Ai, and a payoff function
ui : AÑ R where A is the Cartesian product
A ”
Ś
jPV Aj .
The payoff functions ui map the joint actions of all the
players to a real number. In non-cooperative game theory
we assume players are greedy, rational and act indepen-
dently, by which we mean that each player i always want
to maximize their own utility, subject to the actions se-
lected by others, irrespective of how the optimal action
chosen help or hurt others.
A core solution concept in non-cooperative game the-
ory is that of an Nash equilibrium. A joint action
x P A is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)
of a non-cooperative game if, for each player i, xi P
argmaxaPAi uipa,x´iq. That is, x constitutes a mutual
best-response, no player i has any incentive to unilat-
erally deviate from the prescribed action xi, given the
joint action of the other players x´i P
Ś
jPV ´tiuAj in the
equilibrium. For normal-form games, we denote a game
by G “ tui : AÑ RuiPV , and the set of all pure-strategy
Nash equilibria of G by
NEpGq ” tx | p@i P V, a P Aiq uipxi,x´iq ě uipa,x´iqu .
(1)
A (directed) graphical game is a game-theoretic graph-
ical model [14]. It provides a succinct representation
of normal-form games. In a graphical game, we have
a (directed) graph G “ pV,Eq in which each node in
V corresponds to a player in the game. The inter-
pretation of the edges/arcs E of G is that the pay-
off function of player i is only a function of his own
for learning Bayesian networks has focused exclusively on exact
MLE [4].
action and the actions of the set of parents/neighbors
N piq ” tj | pi, jq P Eu in G (i.e., the set of players corre-
sponding to nodes that point to the node corresponding
to player i in the graph). In this context, for each player i,
we have a local payoff function ui : Aiˆ
Ś
jPN piq Aj Ñ R.
A joint action x P A is a PSNE if, for each player i,
xi P argmaxaPAi uipa,xN piqq. For graphical games, we
denote a game by G “ tui : Ai ˆ
Ś
jPN piq Aj Ñ RuiPV .
In this paper, we focus on polymatrix games [11].
Under this model, the local payoff functions
ui : Ai ˆ
Ś
jPN piq Aj Ñ R have a succint representation
as a sum of a unary potential function uii : Ai Ñ R and
several pairwise potential functions uij : Ai ˆ Aj Ñ R,
that is
uipxi,xN piqq “ uiipxiq `
ÿ
jPN piq
uijpxi, xjq . (2)
For polymatrix graphical games, we denote a game by
G “ tuii : Ai Ñ R, uij : Ai ˆAj Ñ Rui,jPV . We assume
that Ai is a countable finite set such that |Ai| ě 2 for all
players i. Further, |Ai| P Op1q with respect to n and k.
The binary-action models considered in [8, 9, 10] are a
restricted subclass of the models that we consider here.
The results in [8, 9, 10] assume that Ai “ t´1,`1u,
uiipxiq “ wiixi and uijpxi, xjq “ wijxixj for all i, j and
for a weight matrix W P Rnˆn.
Equivalence Classes. Each PSNE set defines an
equivalence class of games for which players have the
same joint behavior. Thus, as argued further in Section
4 in [9] for binary-action games, it is not possible to re-
cover the structure and payoff functions of the true game
from observed joint actions. Instead, we can recover the
PSNE set (or equivalence class) of the true game. Here,
we study the sufficient and necessary number of samples
for the correct recovery of the PSNE set of the true game.
Main Assumptions. Our assumptions are minimal:
• We do not assume the availability of any informa-
tion regarding the structure or parameters of the
true graphical game. The problem is precisely to
infer that information.
• We do not assume the availability of data related to
the temporal dynamics, i.e., each player’s move. In-
stead, we assume that we only observe steady-state
joint actions, i.e., NE. Learning only from NEs, is
arguably more challenging than learning from tem-
poral dynamics.
• To make learning even more challenging, we assume
that data might be not entirely faithful to a graphi-
cal game. That is, we assume that a portion of the
joint actions in the observed/training data is not an
NE. This “corruption” can be modeled via a noise
mechanism.
• Learning games is an unsupervised task, i.e., we
do not know which joint actions in the ob-
served/training data are NE or not.
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• We assume that payoffs are unavailable in the ob-
served/training data, which is a reasonable assump-
tion in some real-world instances.
3 Learning Graphical Games
In this paper, we define H to be the class of polymatrix
graphical games with n nodes and at most k parents per
node, as follows2
H ”
$&
%
G | G “ tuii : Ai Ñ R, uij : Ai ˆAj Ñ Rui,jPV
^p@i P V q |N piq| ď k
^ |NEpGq| P t1, . . . , |A| ´ 1u
,.
- .
Next, we introduce an extension of the generative model
proposed in [9] originally for binary actions. Let G be a
game, and let QG be a set defined as follows
3
QG ”
´
|NEpGq|
|A| , 1´
1
2|A|
ı
.
With some probability q P QG , a joint action x is cho-
sen uniformly at random from NEpGq; otherwise, x is
chosen uniformly at random from its complement set
A´NEpGq. Hence, the generative model is a mix-
ture model with mixture parameter q corresponding to
the probability that a stable outcome (i.e., a PSNE)
of the game is observed, uniform over PSNE. Formally,
the probability mass function (PMF) over joint-behaviors
x P A parameterized by pG, qq is
pG,qpxq ” q
1rxPNEpGqs
|NEpGq| ` p1´ qq
1rxRNEpGqs
|A|´|NEpGq| , (3)
where we can think of q as the “signal” level, and thus
1´ q as the “noise” level in the data. Additionally, PG,q
denotes the probability distribution defined by the PMF
pG,qp¨q.
By using the PMF in eq.(3), we can define a (scaled)
negative log-likelihood function over joint-behaviors x P
A for a game G and mixture parameter q as follows
LG,qpxq “ ´
log pG,qpxq
log p2|A|2q
“ ´ 1rxPNEpGqs
log p2|A|2q log
q
|NEpGq|
´ 1rxRNEpGqs
log p2|A|2q log
1´q
|A|´|NEpGq| . (4)
Note that since we scale the negative log-likelihood with
a factor 1{ log p2|A|2q then LG,qpxq P r0, 1s for all G P H,
q P QG and x P A.
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) allows to infer
the game (and mixture parameter) from observed joint
actions. More formally, given a dataset S of m joint ac-
tions, the empirical MLE minimizer is
ppG, pqq “ argmin
GPH,qPQG
1
m
ÿ
xPS
LG,qpxq .
2NEpGq ‰ H and NEpGq ‰ A ensure that PG,q does not degen-
erate into a uniform distribution, see e.g., Definition 4 in [9].
3q ą |NEpGq|{|A| ensures that pG,qpx1q ą pG,qpx2q for x1 P
NEpGq,x2 R NEpGq, see e.g., Proposition 5 and Definition 7 in [9].
Assume that a joint action x is drawn from an arbitrary
data distribution D. The expected MLE minimizer is
given by
pG, qq “ argmin
GPH,qPQG
EDrLG,qpxqs .
Note that if the data is generated by a true game G˚ P H
and mixture parameter q˚ P QG˚ , then the expected MLE
minimizer is the true game and mixture parameter. That
is, if D “ PG˚,q˚ then NEpGq “ NEpG
˚q and q “ q˚.
4 Sufficient Samples for PSNE
Recovery
In this section, we show that if the number of samples is
greater than Opkn log2 nq for sparse graphs orOpn2 lognq
for dense graphs, then MLE correctly recovers the PSNE
with high probability.
Number of PSNE Sets. First, we show that the
number of PSNE sets induced by polymatrix graphical
games is Opekn log
2 nq for sparse graphs, and Open
2 log nq
for dense graphs. These results will be useful later in ob-
taining a generalization bound as well as for analyzing
the correct recovery of PSNE.
Lemma 1 (Number of PSNE sets). Let H be the
class of polymatrix graphical games with n nodes and
at most k parents per node. Let dpHq be the num-
ber of PSNE sets that can be produced by games
in H, i.e., dpHq “ |YGPHtNEpGqu|. We have that
dpHq P Opekn log
2 nq for k P Op1q, and dpHq P Open
2 log nq
for k P Opnq.
Proof. Let Ai “ t1, . . . , |Ai|u for all i P V , w.l.o.g.
First, we introduce an equivalent representation of
polymatrix graphical games. To each unary po-
tential function uii : Ai Ñ R, we associate a vec-
tor θpiq P R|Ai| such that uiipxiq “
ř
bPAi
θ
piq
b 1rxi “ bs.
To each pairwise potential function uij : Ai ˆAj Ñ R,
we associate a matrix Θpi,jq P R|Ai|ˆ|Aj| such that
uijpxi, xjq “
ř
bPAi,cPAj
θ
pi,jq
bc 1rxi “ b, xj “ cs. Note that
the payoff functions ui are linear with respect to the vec-
tors θpiq and matrices Θpi,jq for all i, j P V , that is
uipxi,x´iq “
ÿ
bPAi
θ
piq
b 1rxi “ bs
`
ÿ
jPV,bPAi,cPAj
θ
pi,jq
bc 1rxi “ b, xj “ cs .
In the above, we can define the parent/neighbor set
N piq ” tj | Θpi,jq ‰ 0u and thus, summation across j P V
is equivalent to summation across j P N piq.
By eq.(1), we have that a PSNE x fulfills
uipxi,x´iq ´ uipa,x´iq ě 0 for all i P V and a P Ai. For
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polymatrix graphical games, for all players i and a P Ai,
a PSNE x fulfillsÿ
bPAi
θ
piq
b 1rxi “ bs `
ÿ
jPV,bPAi,cPAj
θ
pi,jq
bc 1rxi “ b, xj “ cs
´θpiqa ´
ÿ
jPV,cPAj
θpi,jqac 1rxj “ cs ě 0 .
Thus, a PSNE is defined by
ř
iPV |Ai| linear inequalities
with respect to the vectors θpiq and matrices Θpi,jq.
For every player i and a P Ai, let
Dpiq ” p1` |Ai|qp1 `
ř
jPV ´tiu |Aj |q and define the
vectors ypi,aq P t0, 1uDpiq and φpi,aq P RDpiq as follows
ypi,aq ” pt1rxi “ bsubPAi , t1rxi “ b, xj “ csujPV,bPAi,cPAj ,
´ 1, t´1rxj “ csujPV,cPAjq ,
φpi,aq ” ptθ
piq
b ubPAi , tθ
pi,jq
bc ujPV,bPAi,cPAj ,
θpiqa , tθ
pi,jq
ac ujPV,cPAj q .
For polymatrix graphical games, a PSNE x ful-
fills φpi,aq
T
ypi,aq ě 0 for all i P V and a P Ai.
Let Dpi, kq ” p1` |Ai|qp1 `maxpiĎV´tiu,|pi|ďk
ř
jPpi |Aj |q.
For every player i and a P Ai, define the function class
Hpi,aq as follows
Hpi,aq ”
$’&
’%
f : t0, 1uDpiq Ñ t0, 1u |
fpypi,aqq “ 1rφpi,aq
T
ypi,aq ě 0s ^
φpi,aq P RDpiq ^
ř
l 1rφ
pi,aq
l ‰ 0s ď Dpi, kq
,/.
/- .
Note that Hpi,aq is the class of linear classifiers in Dpiq di-
mensions, of weight vectors with at most Dpi, kq nonzero
elements. For k P Op1q, by Theorem 20 in [16] for the
Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of sparse linear
classifiers, and since Dpi, kq P Opkq and Dpiq P Opnq, the
VC dimension of Hpi,aq is bounded as follows
VCpHpi,aqq ď 2pDpi, kq ` 1q logDpiq
P Opk lognq . (5)
For k “ n´ 1, we have that Dpi, n´ 1q “ Dpiq P Opnq,
by the well-known VC dimension of linear classifiers, we
have
VCpHpi,aqq ď Dpiq ` 1
P Opnq . (6)
Recall that a PSNE is defined by D ”
ř
iPV |Ai|
linear inequalities. Define the boolean function
g : t0, 1uD Ñ t0, 1u as follows
gptziauiPV,aPAiq ”
ś
iPV,aPAi
zia .
Note that if f pi,aq P Hpi,aq for all i and a P Ai, then
gptf pi,aqpypi,aqquiPV,aPAiq “ 1 ô x P NEpGq. Define the
function class
gptHpi,aquiPV,aPAiq ”
"
gptf pi,aqpypi,aqquiPV,aPAiq |
p@i P V, a P Aiq f
pi,aq P Hpi,aq
*
.
By Lemma 2 in [19] then
VCpgptHpi,aquiPV,aPAiqq
ď 2Dp1` logDq max
iPV,aPAi
VCpHpi,aqq .
Note that D P Opnq. For k P Op1q, by eq.(5), we have
VCpgptHpi,aquiPV,aPAiqq P Opkn log
2 nq. For k P Opnq, by
eq.(6), we have VCpgptHpi,aquiPV,aPAiqq P Opn
2 log nq.
Finally, note that our analysis of VCpgpH1, . . . ,Hnqq
provides a bound with respect to PSNE, while
we are interested on PSNE sets. Therefore,
dpHq ď maxiPV |Ai|
VCpgpH1,...,Hnqq P OpeVCpgpH1,...,Hnqqq
and we prove our claim.
Generalization Bound. Next, we show that if the
number of samples is greater than Opkn log2 nq for sparse
graphs orOpn2 lognq for dense graphs, then the empirical
MLE minimizer is close to the best achievable expected
log-likelihood.
Lemma 2 (Generalization bound). Fix δ, ε P p0, 1q. Let
H be the class of polymatrix graphical games with n nodes
and at most k parents per node. Assume an arbitrary
data distribution D. Assume that S is a dataset of m
joint actions (of the n players), each independently drawn
from D. If m P Op 1
ε2
pkn log2 n` log 1
δ
qq for k P Op1q or
m P Op 1
ε2
pn2 logn` log 1
δ
qq for k P Opnq, then
PSrEDrL pG,pqpxq ´ LG,qpxqs ď εs ě 1´ δ .
Proof. For clarity, let LSpG, qq ”
1
m
ř
xPS LG,qpxq and
LDpG, qq ” EDrLG,qpxqs. By Lemma 11 in [9], for any
game G and for 0 ă q2 ă q1 ă q ă 1, if for any ε ą 0 we
have
|LSpG, qq ´ LDpG, qq| ď ε^ |LSpG, q
2q ´ LDpG, q
2q| ď ε
ñ |LSpG, q
1q ´ LSpG, q
1q| ď ε .
The above implies that for any game G and for any ε ą 0,
we have that
p@q P BQGq |LSpG, qq ´ LDpG, qq| ď ε
ñ p@q P QGq |LSpG, qq ´ LDpG, qq| ď ε ,
where BQG is the boundary of the set QG , i.e.,
BQG “ t
|NEpGq|
|A| , 1´
1
2|A|u. From the above, the union
bound, the Hoeffding’s inequality and Lemma 1, we have
that
PSrp@G P H, q P QGq |LSpG, qq ´ LDpG, qq| ď
ε
2
s
“ 1´ PSrpDG P H, q P QGq |LSpG, qq ´ LDpG, qq| ą
ε
2
s
ě 1´ PSrpDG P H, q P BQGq |LSpG, qq ´ LDpG, qq| ą
ε
2
s
ě 1´ 2 dpHqPSr|LSpG, qq ´ LDpG, qq| ą
ε
2
s
ě 1´ 4 dpHq e´mε
2{2
ě 1´ δ ,
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where dpHq is the number of PSNE sets that can be pro-
duced by games inH, as defined in Lemma 1. The factor 2
in 2 dpHq in the union bound comes from the fact that the
set BQG has exactly two elements. Let T pn, kq ” kn log
2 n
if k P Op1q, and T pn, kq ” n2 logn if k P Opnq. By solv-
ing for m in the last inequality, since dpHq P OpeT pn,kqq,
we get m P Op 1
ε2
pT pn, kq ` log 1
δ
qq.
We proved so far that with probability at least 1´ δ,
we have |LSpG, qq ´ LDpG, qq| ď
ε
2
simultaneously for all
G P H and q P QG . Additionally, since ppG, pqq is the pair
with minimum LSpG, qq from all G P H and q P QG , we
have that
EDrL pG,pqpxq ´ LG,qpxqs “ LDppG, pqq ´ LDpG, qq
ď LSppG, pqq ` ε2 ´ LSpG, qq ` ε2
ď ε ,
with probability at least 1´ δ, which proves our claim.
Sufficient Samples for PSNE Recovery. Finally,
we show that if the number of samples is greater than
Opkn log2 nq for sparse graphs or Opn2 lognq for dense
graphs, then MLE correctly recovers the PSNE with high
probability.
Theorem 3 (Sufficient samples for PSNE recovery). Fix
δ, ε P p0, 1q. Let H be the class of polymatrix graph-
ical games with n nodes and at most k parents per
node. Assume that the data distribution D “ PG˚,q˚
for some true game G˚ P H and mixture parameter
q˚ P QG˚ . Assume that S is a dataset of m joint
actions (of the n players), each independently drawn
from D. If m P Op 1
ε2
pkn log2 n` log 1
δ
qq for k P Op1q or
m P Op 1
ε2
pn2 logn` log 1
δ
qq for k P Opnq, then
PSrNEpG
˚q Ď NEppGqs ě 1´ δ .
provided that |NEpG˚q| ě 2 and ε ă βp|NEpG˚q|, q˚q
where4
βpr, qq “ 1
log p2|A|2q
¨
˚˝q log qr ` p1´ qq log 1´q|A|´r
´ r´1
r
q log q
r´1
´
`
q
r
` 1´ q
˘
log 1´q|A|´r`1
˛
‹‚.
Proof. Here, we follow a worst case approach in which
we analyze the identifiability of the PSNE set of G˚ with
respect to a game G´ that has one PSNE less than G˚.
For our argument, showing the existence of such polyma-
trix graphical game G´ is not necessary. In fact, a more
general argument could be made with respect to a game
that has k´ ě 1 less PSNEs than G˚. The analysis for
k´ “ 1 provides the sufficient conditions for the general
case k´ ě 1.
4βpr, qq ď q
2r
. This maximum value is reached when |A| Ñ 8.
For clarity, let cpnq ” log p2|A|2q, yNE ” NEppGq and
NE˚ ” NEpG˚q. Define the game G´ by its PSNE
set NE´ ” NEpG´q as follows. Define the set
NE´ “ NE˚ ´ txu for some x P NE˚. It can be easily
verified that
|NE´| “ |NE˚| ´ 1 ,
|NE˚ XNE´| “ |NE˚| ´ 1 , |NE˚ YNE´| “ |NE˚| ,
|NE˚ ´NE´| “ 1 , |NE´ ´NE˚| “ 0 .
For any pair of games G,G1 P H, let NE ” NEpGq and
NE 1 ” NEpG1q. For any pair of games G,G1 P H, and
mixture parameters q P QG and q
1 P QG1 , we have
EPG,q rlog pG1,q1pxqs “
ÿ
xPA
pG,qpxq log pG1,q1pxq
“
ÿ
xPNEXNE 1
pG,qpxq log pG1,q1pxq
`
ÿ
xPNE´NE 1
pG,qpxq log pG1,q1pxq
`
ÿ
xPNE1´NE
pG,qpxq log pG1,q1pxq
`
ÿ
xRNEYNE 1
pG,qpxq log pG1,q1pxq
“ |NEXNE
1|
|NE| q log
q1
|NE 1|
` |NE´NE
1|
|NE| q log
1´q1
|A|´|NE1|
` |NE
1´NE|
|A|´|NE| p1´ qq log
q1
|NE 1|
` |A|´|NEYNE
1|
|A|´|NE| p1´ qq log
1´q1
|A|´|NE 1| . (7)
Note that the pair pG´, q˚q is well defined. More
formally, since |NE´| “ |NE˚| ´ 1 then we
have that QG´ “ pp|NE
˚| ´ 1q{|A|, 1´ 1{p2|A|qs. Thus,
q˚ P QG˚ ñ q
˚ P QG´ . From eq.(7), we have
KLpPG˚,q˚}PG´,q˚q
“ EP
G˚,q˚
rlog pG˚,q˚pxq ´ log pG´,q˚pxqs
“ q˚ log q
˚
|NE˚|
` p1´ q˚q log 1´q
˚
|A|´|NE˚|
´ |NE
˚|´1
|NE˚|
q˚ log q
˚
|NE˚|´1
´
´
q˚
|NE˚|
` 1´ q˚
¯
log 1´q
˚
|A|´|NE˚|`1
.
By the assumption in the theorem and the above, we have
that
cpnq ε ă cpnqβpn, |NE˚|, q˚q
“ KLpPG˚,q˚}PG´,q˚q . (8)
Note that since D “ PG˚,q˚ then NEpGq “ NEpG
˚q
and q “ q˚. By Lemma 2 and eq.(4), if
m P Op 1
ε2
pkn log2 n` log 1
δ
qq for k P Op1q or
m P Op 1
ε2
pn2 logn` log 1
δ
qq for k P Opnq, then
cpnq ε ě cpnqEP
G˚,q˚
rL pG,pqpxq ´ LG˚,q˚pxqs
“ EP
G˚,q˚
rlog pG˚,q˚pxq ´ log p pG,pqpxqs
“ KLpPG˚,q˚}P pG,pqq .
5
Note that from the above and eq.(8), we have that
KLpPG˚,q˚}P pG,pqq ă KLpPG˚,q˚}PG´,q˚q. That is, the
empirical MLE minimizer ppG, pqq is better than the pair
pG´, q˚q. Therefore, yNE includes all the PSNE in NE˚,
i.e., NE˚ ĎyNE and we prove our claim.
Remark. A similar argument as in Theorem 3 can
be used to show that NEppGq Ď NEpG˚q, although the
sufficient number of samples increases to Opkn3 log2 nq
for sparse graphs, and Opn4 lognq for dense graphs.
(The function β in such a case does not contain the
1{ log p2|A|2q P Op1{nq factor.)
5 Necessary Samples for PSNE
Recovery
In this section, we show that if the number of samples
is less than Ωpkn log2 nq for sparse graphs or Ωpn2 lognq
for dense graphs, then any conceivable method fails to
recover the PSNE with probability at least 1{2.
Theorem 4 (Necessary samples for PSNE recovery). Let
H be the class of polymatrix graphical games with n nodes
and at most k parents per node. Assume that the true
game G˚ is chosen uniformly at random (by nature) from
a finite subset of H. Assume that the true mixture pa-
rameter q˚ is known to the learner. After choosing the
true game G˚, nature generates a dataset S of m joint ac-
tions (of the n players), each independently drawn from
PG˚,q˚ . Assume that a learner uses the dataset S in or-
der to choose a game pG. If m P Ωpkn log2 nq for k P Op1q
or m P Ωpn2 lognq for k P Opnq, then
PG˚,SrNEppGq ‰ NEpG˚qs ě 1{2 ,
for any conceivable learning mechanism for choosing pG.
Proof. Let Ai “ t1, . . . , |Ai|u for all i P V , w.l.o.g. Let
Π “ tpi | pi Ď V ^ |pi| “ ku. Let pi P Π be the set of k “in-
fluential” players. Assume that nature picks pi uniformly
at random from the
`
n
k
˘
elements in Π. For a fixed pi,
we will construct a true game Gpi . For clarity, we define
Gpi ” G˚ and q ” q˚. The goal of the learner is to use the
dataset S in order to choose a set ppi of k players, and to
output a game Gppi ” pG.
For a fixed pi, we construct a game Gpi with a single
PSNE (i.e., |NEpGpiq| “ 1) as follows. The k “influential”
players do not have any parent, i.e., N piq “ H for i P pi.
We force the “influential” players i P pi to have a best
response 1, by setting their potential functions as follows.
p@i P piq uiipxiq “ 1rxi “ 1s .
By eq.(2), the local payoff function for i P pi becomes
uipxiq “ 1rxi “ 1s. The remaining n´ k “influenced”
players have the k “influential” players as parents, i.e.,
N piq “ pi for i R pi. We force the “influenced” players to
have a best response 2, by setting their potential functions
as follows
p@i R piq uiipxiq “ 0 ,
p@i R pi, j P piq uijpxi, xjq “ 1rxi “ 2, xj “ 1s .
By eq.(2), the local payoff function for i R pi becomes
uipxi, xN piqq “
ř
jPpi 1rxi “ 2, xj “ 1s. The constructed
game Gpi has a single PSNE xpi . More specifically
p@i P piq xpii “ 1 ,
p@i R piq xpii “ 2 ,
NEpGpiq “ txpiu .
Since we assume a known fixed mixture parameter q and
since |NEpGpiq| “ 1, the PMF defined in eq.(3) reduces to
ppipxq ” pGpi ,qpxq
“ 1rx “ xpis q ` 1rx ‰ xpis 1´q|A|´1 .
Let Ppi denote the probability distribution defined by the
PMF ppip¨q. Clearly, pi ‰ pi
1 ô xpi ‰ xpi
1
. Thus, for all
pi ‰ pi1 the Kullback-Leibler divergence is bounded as fol-
lows
KLpPpi}Ppi1q “
ÿ
xPA
ppipxq log ppipxq ´
ÿ
xPA
ppipxq log ppi1pxq
“ ppipx
piq log ppipx
piq `
ÿ
x‰xpi
ppipxq log ppipxq
´ ppipx
piq log ppi1px
piq ´ ppipx
pi1q log ppi1px
pi1q
´
ÿ
xRtxpi,xpi1u
ppipxq log ppi1pxq
“ q log q ` p|A| ´ 1q 1´q|A|´1 log
´
1´q
|A|´1
¯
´q log
´
1´q
|A|´1
¯
´ 1´q|A|´1 log q
´p|A| ´ 2q 1´q|A|´1 log
´
1´q
|A|´1
¯
“ |A|q´1|A|´1
´
log q ´ log
´
1´q
|A|´1
¯¯
.
Assume that the value of the mixture parameter (known
to the learner) is q ” 2{|A| P QGpi . Thus, for all pi ‰ pi
1
we have
KLpPpi}Ppi1q “
log p|A|´1q´log p|A|{2´1q
|A|´1
P Op1{pn lognq .
Conditioned on pi, S is a dataset of m i.i.d. joint ac-
tions drawn from Ppi. That is, S | pi „ P
m
pi . The mu-
tual information can be bounded by a pairwise KL-based
bound [21] as follows
Ippi, Sq ď
1
|Π|2
ÿ
piPΠ
ÿ
pi1PΠ
KLpPmpi }P
m
pi1 q
ď max
pi‰pi1
KLpPmpi }P
m
pi1 q
“ m max
pi‰pi1
KLpPpi}Ppi1q
P Opm{pn lognqq .
6
Note that ppi “ pi ô NEpGppiq “ NEpGpiq. Let
T pn, kq ” k logn if k P Op1q, and T pn, kq ” n if
k “ n{2. Next, we show that log |Π| P ΩpT pn, kqq.
For k P Op1q, we have |Π| “
`
n
k
˘
ě pn
k
qk and thus
log |Π| P Ωpk lognq “ ΩpT pn, kqq. For k “ n{2,
we have |Π| “
`
n
n{2
˘
ě p n
n{2 q
n{2 “ 2n{2 and thus
log |Π| P Ωpnq “ ΩpT pn, kqq. By the Fano’s inequal-
ity [5] on the Markov chain pi Ñ S Ñ ppi we have
PG˚,SrNEppGq ‰ NEpG˚qs “ Ppi,SrNEpGppiq ‰ NEpGpiqs
“ Ppi,Srppi ‰ pis
ě 1´
Ippi, Sq ` log 2
log |Π|
ě 1´O
ˆ
m{pn lognq
T pn, kq
˙
“ 1{2 .
By solving the last equality, we prove our claim.
6 Concluding Remarks
There are several ways of extending this research. Other
noise processes can be analyzed, such as a local noise
model where the observations are drawn from the PSNE
set, and subsequently, each action is independently cor-
rupted by noise. Other equilibria concepts can also be
studied, such as mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, corre-
lated equilibria and epsilon Nash equilibria.
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